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ABSTRACT 
This research develops an attacker-defender model of maritime trading. The defender’s 
problem is represented as a minimum cost, multi-commodity network flow model. 
System cost is measured in terms of total ton-nautical miles in the network. Our network 
contains the 120 most important ports in the world (by volume of cargo), 35 waypoints at 
sea, and 416 arcs. Port supply and demand have been estimated from different sources. 
Interdictions represent manmade disruption of the seaways, such as those in the presence 
of piracy. An interdicted arc is assumed to incur a penalty equivalent to the additional 
distance that a ship would need to travel in order to avoid the threat, or a total blockade of 
the arc in the case of straits and canals. We analyze several scenarios with varying 
assumptions on the defended arcs and the number of simultaneous interdictions. The 
most disruptive, single interdiction occurs in the Strait of Gibraltar, increasing cost by 
almost 25%, followed by the Straits of Bab el Mandeb (20%) and Suez Canal (19%). For 
two simultaneous interdictions, cost increases to 33%, but decreases to 23%, 8% and 
1.5% when we defend three, four or five select straits and canals, respectively. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Maritime transportation supports approximately 80% of total world trade; as such, the 
study of the vulnerability of containerized and bulk shipping to acts of piracy and 
terrorism is important for the global economy. During 2011, there were 45 vessels 
hijacked, 176 boarded, 113 fired upon and 105 reports of attempted attacks. Most of these 
attacks took place in the Gulf of Aden, crossed by some of the busiest routes in the world. 
237 of these attacks were mounted by Somali pirates.  This research assesses worst-case 
scenarios of disruption to maritime trade caused by piracy, small terrorist groups, or 
political reasons. 
We develop and implement an attacker-defender, multi-commodity network 
optimization model in order to assess the resiliency of the world’s maritime network to 
the interdiction of strategic maritime seaways. Specifically, our model determines 
optimal sets of one, two and three interdictions that would cause the largest cost 
(measured in ton-nautical miles) for the flow of cargo to meet all the demands. 
Our network contains 120 nodes representing the most important ports in the 
world (based on volume of cargo), 35 waypoint nodes at sea, and 416 arcs. The supply 
and demand data to populate the model have been estimated from different sources, 
including: total volumes handled by each port, trade balances, import and export rates 
among countries, and a gravity model. 
We assume the interdiction of an arc incurs a penalty equivalent to the additional 
distance that a ship would need to travel in order to avoid the threat. In cases of straits 
and canals we assume a total blockade of the arc, forcing the model to seek alternative 
routes of transportation. 
We analyze several scenarios in which we manually set a limited number of 
defended arcs, vary the number of simultaneous interdictions allowed for the attacker, 
and enumerate a ranking of worst-case interdictions by cost. 
Excluding cases where ports become isolated, we find that the attack (and 
closure) of the Strait of Gibraltar alone generates the largest disruption, with a cost 
  xvi
increase of 24.65% with respect to the non-interdicted network. We identify other 
important, single attacks in the Strait of Bab el Mandeb (cost increment of 19.79%), Suez 
Canal (18.70%), Panama Canal (7.66%), and Strait of Malacca (5.96%). In some of these 
cases, the interdiction is explained by the increase in distance the cargo would need to 
travel, whereas in other cases the predominant factor is the amount of cargo involved.  
For two simultaneous interdictions, the interdiction of the Panama Canal and the 
Strait of Gibraltar generates the largest disruption, producing a cost increment of 33.22%. 
When the Panama and Suez canals, and the Strait of Gibraltar are assumed to be 
defended, the optimal interdictions become the Strait of Bab el Mandeb and the Strait of 
Malacca, with a cost increment of 22.54%. 
Assuming all the arcs in Gibraltar, Panama, Suez and Bab el Mandeb are 
defended, the optimal simultaneous attack on two arcs involves the arcs of the straits of 
Malacca and Sunda, with 8.27% cost increase. If we allow three interdictions, an attack 
on the arcs in the straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok increases cost by 15.54%. When 
the Strait of Malacca is also defended, the cost of two interdictions decreases to 1.5%, 
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A. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
Maritime transportation supports approximately 80% of total world trade, and the 
U.S. deems maritime security of “vital national interest” (Department of Homeland 
Security, 2005). Thus, the study of the vulnerability of containerized and bulk shipping to 
acts of piracy and terrorism is important for the global economy. Current maritime threats 
vary from the possible hijacking of a commercial vessel to ramming an explosive-packed 
small boat into a ship, as in the 2000 attack on the USS Cole (DDG-67) (Carafano, 2007).  
Maritime infrastructure and transportation systems are critical and costly 
engineering systems that enable economic activity through the transfer of 
goods and services between national and international destinations. The 
impact of maritime systems on the economy is so essential that some 
consider the U.S. as a maritime country. For example, in 2003 
approximately 95% of the volume of American overseas trade critical to 
nation’s economic health was carried by maritime systems, mostly in 
containers. (Mansouri, 2009) 
Worldwide maritime routes are currently threatened by piracy. During 2011, there 
were 439 attacks, with 45 vessels hijacked, 176 boarded, 113 fired upon, and 105 reports 
of attempted attacks. 237 of these attacks were mounted by Somali pirates. Most of these 
attacks took place within the intersection of the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea, 
crossed by some of the busiest routes in the world (International Chamber of Commerce, 
2012). Piracy off the coast of Somalia has been estimated to cost over $15 billion per 
year in global trade since 2005 (Nicholson, 2011). Attacks have also been reported in 
other regions of the globe, such as Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent and Nigeria. 
Examining a world maritime route map, it is possible to note other vulnerable bottlenecks 
for maritime traffic, such as the Panama and Suez Canals and the Strait of Gibraltar.  
This research develops and implements network interdiction-optimization models 
(see, e.g., Brown et al., 2005) in order to (a) assess the resiliency of the world’s maritime 
network to the disruption of a few maritime routes at strategic chokepoints; (b) 
recommend alternative routes in case of disruption; and (c) analyze the cost of using  
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alternative routes. Specifically we answer the following question: What subset(s) of 
interdicted seaways would be most critical to global maritime trade and what would be 
the relative level of disruption? 
Though certain natural threats, such as tsunamis, may also disrupt existing 
maritime routes, this research focuses on manmade disruption caused by either:  
1. Piracy, consisting of small terrorist groups, usually seeking to seize the 
cargo or capture the vessel’s crew until a ransom is paid; or,   
2. Political, such as a country’s decision to block access of commercial 
vessels to nearby international waters.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Transportation networks play a crucial role in areas as diverse as human 
mobility, the exchange of goods, and the spread of invasive species. With 
90% of world trade carried by sea, the global network of merchant ships 
provides an essential mode of transportation. The network has several 
features that set it apart from other transportation networks. The network 
of all ship movements possesses a heavy-tailed distribution for the 
connectivity of ports and for the loads transported on the links with 
systematic differences between ship types. (Kaluza, 2010) 
Lee, Chew, and Lee (2006), develop a multi-commodity network flow model to 
estimate the demand at the ports of the Asia-Pacific region. Their model, like the one 
described in this thesis, is based on a premise that shippers attempt to minimize total 
logistics costs. However, they do not assess interdictions. 
Attacker–defender (AD) models are extensively used in network interdiction 
problems to assess worst-case disruption to the maximum flow of commodities through a 
capacitated network. Bard and Moore (1990) introduce techniques to solve an AD, 
mixed-integer, linear program (MIP) as a bilevel model. They develop an algorithm that 
can approximate this problem heuristically. 
Network interdiction has applications including homeland security and counter–
drug operations. In Wood (1993), the author introduces a mathematical model to solve 
deterministic shortest path network interdiction. The model is applied to anti-drug 
smuggling operations where the main focus is the intercept of chemicals used in drug 
production. Wood provides a MIP formulation for a discrete interdiction problem, and 
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provides an extension of the model to allow for continuous interdiction, multiple sources 
and sinks, undirected networks, multiple interdiction resources, and multiple 
commodities. This work was extended by Cormican et al. (1998), to model an attacker 
seeking to minimize the expected maximum flow, given uncertainties in the success of 
interdiction and arc capacities. 
On military applications, Washburn and Wood (1995) build a model that 
represents a situation in which a single evader attempts to traverse a path between two 
nodes in a network while a single “inspector” tries to detect the evader by setting up 
inspection points along the network arcs. The problem for the inspector is to find a 
strategy that maximizes the probability of detecting the evader, while the problem for the 
evader is to find a strategy that minimizes the interdiction probability. Washburn and 
Wood formulate this problem as a two-person, zero-sum matrix game, then show how it 
can be solved using a maximum-flow network model.  
Isreali and Wood (2002) describe a shortest-path network interdiction problem 
and formulate it using a bilevel MIP. They formulate a bilevel, max–min AD problem. 
The resulting MIP can be solved directly, but they develop more efficient decomposition 
algorithms.  
Brown et al. (2006) develop bilevel (AD and defender–attacker) and trilevel 
(defender–attacker–defender) optimization models for the defense of critical 
infrastructure. They apply these models to many real-world examples, such as a strategic 
petroleum reserve, electric power grids, and supply chains, to highlight any vulnerability 
in these infrastructures. They show the benefits of such models in helping decision 
makers to make appropriate defensive plans.   
Bencomo (2009) proposes a model to provide a capability to assess the economic 
impacts on import and export container flows of various types of disruptions to ports or 
to the U.S. domestic transportation system (rail or truck). He introduces a tool to 
represent container flows and the potential changes in these flows under a variety of 
conditions (port disruptions, extensive security-related delays, natural disasters, and so 
forth). The tool includes available data on container movements, estimation of origin–
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destination matrices for international container flows entering or leaving the U.S., and 
development of a network model to represent container movements, both internationally 
and domestically. The international-network model allows flow diversions between U.S. 
ports due to the implementation of security initiatives or port disruptions. The author uses 
a multi-commodity, network flow model that finds paths through the network for 
shipments to minimize their total logistics cost, in travel days, which affects 
transportation and inventory costs. He uses an AD model to represent a transportation 
network subject to interdiction. The model allows the attacker to first attack the network, 
and then the defender optimally alters the flow of containers on the surviving network 
components. 
The work of Pidgeon (2008) introduces a simulation model to identify and 
measure the effects of congestion at container ports on the west coast of the U.S., and 
shipper costs, subsequent to a transportation-security incident (TSI) upon these ports and 
the marine-transportation system.  Pidgeon identifies and quantifies the disruption and 
incremental costs following a TSI at these container ports. He identifies which ports 
contain infrastructure components that are potential bottlenecks or are vulnerable to a TSI 
that threatens maritime shipping capacities, thus indicating they would benefit from 





A. CARGO VOLUME  
In order to create an approximated worldwide maritime traffic network, it is 
necessary to estimate the amount of cargo transported to and from each port, and the sea 
routes (arcs) between nodes (ports and at-sea locations) used by the vessels. 
We use graphical information (see, e.g., Figures 1 and 2) and specific data on 
cargo volume to establish a network that represents global maritime routes and ports.  
Then, using available data and a “gravity model” of flow (described later in this chapter), 
we estimate cargo movements between each pair of ports.  
 
 




Figure 2.   Domains of maritime circulation (From Rodrigue, 2012b) 
We consider the most important ports in the world, based on the amount of cargo 
processed, as specified by the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA, 2012). 
Specifically, the AAPA has published a ranking of the 125 most important ports 
according to the total (outgoing and incoming) volume of cargo in 2008. However, the 
U.S. ports of Tampa, Texas City, and Corpus Christi are duplicated on the list, so we 
keep one of each. Furthermore, the ports of Duluth and Pittsburgh are inner ports (located 
on the banks of rivers), without connection to the ocean, so we erase them from our list of 
interest. The final list comprises 120 ports. 
Unfortunately, no separated information of incoming and outgoing volume has 
been found. As a surrogate for that information, we use the dollar export–import ratio 
(trade balance) of the country where the port is located. These data have been obtained 
from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA, 2012). 
The reader is cautioned that the relation between the incoming and outgoing cargo 
volumes of a port is not necessarily the same as the trade-balance ratio, because the value 
of the imports and exports of a given country are not necessarily proportional to the 
volumes of cargo involved. For example, those can represent technology and services, 
which are not a “cargo.” In addition, the total of exports and imports is not entirely 
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commercialized through the maritime ports of the country: they can use aerial or ground 
alternatives, especially for trading with neighboring countries.  
Table 1 shows the values (in billions of dollars) of imports and exports for year 
2010, and the trade balance for every country with ports included in our model. 
Table 1.   Values (in billions of dollars) of imports and exports,  
and trade balances for year 2010 
Country Exports 2010     ($ billion) 




Australia 212.90 194.70 1.09
Belgium 282.30 284.60 0.99
Brazil 201.90 181.70 1.11
Canada 393.00 401.70 0.98
China 1,578.00 1,327.00 1.19
Egypt 25.02 51.54 0.49
France 517.20 588.40 0.88
Germany 1,303.00 1,099.00 1.19
India 225.60 357.70 0.63
Indonesia 158.10 127.40 1.24
Italy 448.40 473.10 0.95
Japan 730.10 639.10 1.14
Korea South 464.30 422.40 1.10
Malaysia 197.00 152.60 1.29
Netherlands 486.70 429.50 1.13
Norway 132.70 74.30 1.79
Pakistan 24.90 32.88 0.76
Philippines 50.68 61.07 0.83
Romania 49.41 57.22 0.86
Russia 400.40 248.70 1.61
Saudi Arabia 237.90 88.35 2.69
Singapore 358.40 310.40 1.15
South Africa 85.70 81.86 1.05
Spain 253.00 315.30 0.80
Sweden 160.40 149.50 1.07
Turkey 120.90 177.30 0.68
Ukraine 52.19 60.90 0.86
U.K. 410.20 563.20 0.73
U.S. 1,289.00 1,935.00 0.67
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            [2] 
where: 
iO    outgoing cargo volume of port i [thousands of tons] 
iI    incoming cargo volume of port i [thousands of tons] 
iT    total cargo of port i (see Table 2)  [thousands of tons] 
iR    exports/imports ratio of the country having port i (see Table 1) 
  [fraction] 
 
Results for outgoing and incoming volume from and to each port using equations 
(1) and (2) are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2.   Annual outgoing and incoming cargo volume for each port. 
Country Port Total cargo (tons × 1000) 
Outgoing 
cargo          
(tons × 1000) 
Incoming 
cargo          
(tons × 1000) 
Australia Hedland  159,391 83,254 76,137
Australia Dampier  140,823 73,555 67,268
Australia Newcastle  95,839 50,059 45,780
Australia Hay Point  82,519 43,102 39,417
Australia Gladstone  78,801 41,160 37,641
Australia Brisbane  31,894 16,659 15,235
Belgium Antwerp  189,390 94,311 95,079
Belgium Zeebrugge  42,024 20,927 21,097
Brazil Itaqui  105,187 55,363 49,824
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Country Port Total cargo (tons × 1000) 
Outgoing 
cargo          
(tons × 1000) 
Incoming 
cargo          
(tons × 1000) 
Brazil Tubarao  99,873 52,566 47,307
Brazil Sepetiba  84,888 44,679 40,209
Brazil Santos  81,058 42,663 38,395
Brazil Sao Sebastiao  49,759 26,190 23,569
Brazil Paranagua  33,005 17,372 15,633
Brazil Angra dos Reis  30,425 16,014 14,411
Canada Vancouver  114,574 56,660 57,914
China Qingdao 278,271 151,157 127,114
China Qinhuangdao  252,000 136,887 115,113
China Shanghai  508,000 275,946 232,054
China Tianjin  365,163 198,357 166,806
China Ningbo  361,850 196,557 165,293
China Guangzhou 347,000 188,491 158,509
China Hong Kong  259,402 140,908 118,494
China Dalian  246,000 133,628 112,372
China Shenzhen  211,000 114,615 96,385
China Rizhao  151,000 82,023 68,977
China Yingkou  151,000 82,023 68,977
China Nantong  132,000 71,703 60,297
China Yantai  112,000 60,839 51,161
China Nanjing  111,000 60,295 50,705
China Tangshan  109,000 59,209 49,791
China Lianyungang  101,000 54,863 46,137
China Kaohsiung  146,729 79,703 67,026
China Taichung  52,203 28,357 23,846
Egypt 
Alexandria and El-
Dekheila  44,912 14,677 30,235
France Marseilles  96,009 44,913 51,096
France Le Havre  80,527 37,671 42,856
France Dunkirk  57,692 26,988 30,704
France Calais  39,709 18,576 21,133
Germany Hamburg  140,375 76,148 64,227
Germany Bremen 74,647 40,493 34,154
Germany Wilhelmshaven  40,309 21,866 18,443
Germany Lubeck  31,551 17,115 14,436
India Madras (Chennai) 57,497 22,238 35,259
India Jawaharlal Nehru  57,280 22,154 35,126
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Country Port Total cargo (tons × 1000) 
Outgoing 
cargo          
(tons × 1000) 
Incoming 
cargo          
(tons × 1000) 
India Calcutta  54,051 20,905 33,146
India Bombay  51,876 20,064 31,812
India Paradip  46,412 17,951 28,461
India Mormugao  41,680 16,120 25,560
India New Mangalore  36,690 14,190 22,500
Indonesia Tanjung Priok  42,050 23,286 18,764
Italy Genoa  54,218 26,382 27,836
Italy Trieste  48,279 23,492 24,787
Italy Taranto  43,271 21,056 22,215
Italy Leghorn  34,028 16,558 17,470
Japan Nagoya  218,130 116,314 101,816
Japan Chiba  165,143 88,059 77,084
Japan Yokohama  141,764 75,593 66,171
Japan Kitakyushu  109,367 58,318 51,049
Japan Kobe 95,186 50,756 44,430
Japan Osaka  92,976 49,578 43,398
Japan Tokyo  81,328 43,367 37,961
Korea South Busan  241,683 126,552 115,131
Korea South Ulsan  170,279 89,163 81,116
Korea South Inchon  141,815 74,258 67,557
Korea South Pohang  67,657 35,427 32,230
Malasyia Kelang  152,348 85,848 66,500
Malasyia Tanjung Pelepas  87,939 49,554 38,385
Netherlands Rotterdam  421,136 223,714 197,422
Netherlands Amsterdam 94,768 50,342 44,426
Norway Bergen  52,428 33,610 18,818
Pakistan Karachi  37,193 16,028 21,165
Philippines Manila  45,230 20,512 24,718
Romania Constantza  61,837 28,654 33,183
Russia Novorossisk  81,633 50,356 31,277
Russia Primorsk  75,582 46,623 28,959
Russia St. Petersburg  59,945 36,977 22,968
Saudi 
Arabia Jubail  42,460 30,962 11,498
Saudi 
Arabia Yanbu  37,509 27,351 10,158
Saudi 
Arabia Jeddah  45,721 33,340 12,381
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Country Port Total cargo (tons × 1000) 
Outgoing 
cargo          
(tons × 1000) 
Incoming 
cargo          
(tons × 1000) 
Singapore Singapore  515,415 276,203 239,212
South Africa Richards Bay  84,534 43,236 41,298
South Africa Saldanha Bay  46,532 23,799 22,733
South Africa Durban  41,403 21,176 20,227
Spain 
Algeciras - La 
Linea  69,572 30,973 38,599
Spain Valencia  59,425 26,455 32,970
Spain Barcelona  50,545 22,502 28,043
Spain Bilbao  37,980 16,908 21,072
Spain Tarragona  32,969 14,677 18,292
Sweden Gothenburg  43,241 22,381 20,860
Turkey Izmit (Kocaeli)  53,852 21,833 32,019
U.K. 
Grimsby and 
Immingham  65,267 30,120 35,147
U.K. London  52,965 24,443 28,522
U.K. 
Tees and 
Hartlepool  45,436 20,968 24,468
U.K. Southampton  40,974 18,909 22,065
U.K. Forth 39,054 18,023 21,031
U.K. Milford Haven  35,875 16,556 19,319
U.K. Liverpool 32,204 14,862 17,342
Ukraine Odessa  34,562 14,565 19,997
U.S. South Louisiana  203,157 81,225 121,932
U.S. Houston  192,473 76,953 115,520
U.S. 
New York/New 
Jersey  139,207 55,657 83,550
U.S. Corpus Christi  79,079 31,617 47,462
U.S. Long Beach  72,746 29,085 43,661
U.S. New Orleans  66,221 26,476 39,745
U.S. Beaumont  63,022 25,197 37,825
U.S. Huntington  62,887 25,143 37,744
U.S. Mobile  61,345 24,527 36,818
U.S. Hampton Roads  60,947 24,367 36,580
U.S. Plaquemines  57,816 23,116 34,700
U.S. Los Angeles  161,900 64,730 97,170
U.S. Lake Charles  48,777 19,502 29,275
U.S. Texas City  47,714 19,077 28,637
U.S. Baton Rouge  46,991 18,788 28,203
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Country Port Total cargo (tons × 1000) 
Outgoing 
cargo          
(tons × 1000) 
Incoming 
cargo          
(tons × 1000) 
U.S. Tampa  42,613 17,037 25,576
U.S. Baltimore, MD  39,375 15,743 23,632
U.S. Paulsboro  32,971 13,182 19,789
U.S. Valdez  32,622 13,043 19,579
U.S. Savannah  32,102 12,835 19,267
U.S. Pascagoula  30,466 12,181 18,285
 
The next step consists of finding the volume of cargo from each port to the 
remaining 119 ports. No information has been found from the AAPA regarding 
destinations and the volume of cargo that navigates towards each destination, or the 
procedence and quantity of the cargo that arrives to each port. Therefore, these data have 
been inferred using the CIA’s World Factbook, which provides partial information about 
the destination of the exports and the origin of the importations for the countries involved 
in this model (see Tables 3 and 4). 
Table 3.   Export partners by country. 
Country Export partners 
Australia China 25.1%, Japan 18.9%, South Korea 8.9%, India 7.1%, U.S. 4%  
Belgium   Germany 19.1%, France 17%, Netherlands 12.2%, U.K. 7.2%, U.S. 5.3%, Italy 4.7%  
Brazil China 15.2%, U.S. 9.6%, Argentina 9.2%, Netherlands 5.1%, Germany 4%  
Canada U.S. 74.9%, U.K. 4.1% 
China U.S. 18%, Hong Kong 13.8%, Japan 7.6%, South Korea 4.4%, Germany 4.3% 
Egypt U.S. 7.6%, Italy 7.3%, India 6.1%, Spain 5.4%, Saudi Arabia 5.4%, France 4.7%, Libya 4% 
France Germany 16.4%, Italy 8.2%, Belgium 7.7%, Spain 7.6%, U.K. 6.8%, U.S. 5.1%, Netherlands 4.2% 
Germany France 10.1%, U.S. 6.7%, U.K. 6.6%, Netherlands 6.6%, Italy 6.3%, Austria 5.7%, Belgium 5.2%, China 4.7%, Switzerland 4.5% 
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Country Export partners 
India U.S. 12.6%, UAE 12.2%, China 8.1%, Hong Kong 4.1% 
Indonesia Japan 16.3%, China 10%, U.S. 9.1%, Singapore 8.7%, South Korea 8%, India 6.3%, Malaysia 5.9% 
Italy Germany 13.2%, France 11.7%, Spain 5.9%, U.S. 5.8%, U.K. 5.4%, Switzerland 4.6% 
Japan China 19.4%, U.S. 15.7%, South Korea 8.1%, Hong Kong 5.5%, Thailand 4.4% 
Korea 
South China 27.9%, U.S. 10.2%, Japan 5.8% 
Malaysia Singapore 13.4%, China 12.6%, Japan 10.4%, U.S. 9.5%, Thailand 5.3%, Hong Kong 5.1% 
Netherlands Germany 26%, Belgium 13%, France 9.2%, U.K. 7.7%, Italy 4.9% 
Norway U.K. 26.7%, Netherlands 12.1%, Germany 11.4%, Sweden 7%, France 6.6%, U.S. 5% 
Pakistan U.S. 15.8%, Afghanistan 8.1%, UAE 7.9%, China 7.3%, U.K. 4.3%, Germany 4.2% 
Philippines China 19%, U.S. 13.4%, Singapore 13.2%, Japan 12.8%, Hong Kong 7.6%, Germany 4.2%, South Korea 4.1% 
Romania Germany 18.4%, Italy 14.1%, France 8.5%, Turkey 6.9%, Hungary 4.9%  
Russia Germany 8.2%, Netherlands 6%, U.S. 5.6%, China 5.4%, Turkey 4.6%  
Saudi 
Arabia 
Japan 14.3%, China 13.1%, U.S. 13%, South Korea 8.8%, India 8.3%, 
Singapore 4.5% 
Singapore Malaysia 11.9%, Hong Kong 11.7%, China 10.4%, Indonesia 9.4%, U.S. 6.5%, Japan 4.7%, South Korea 4.1% 
South 
Africa 
China 13.7%, U.S. 10.1%, Japan 8.7%, Germany 7.3%, U.K. 7.1%, India 
4.3% 
Spain France 18.7%, Germany 10.7%, Portugal 9.1%, Italy 9%, U.K. 6.3%  
Sweden Germany 10.5%, Norway 9.8%, U.K. 7.8%, Denmark 6.9%, Finland 6.5%, U.S. 6.4%, Netherlands 5.2%, France 5.2%, Belgium 4.3% 
Turkey Germany 10.1%, U.K. 6.4%, Italy 5.7%, France 5.3%, Iraq 5.3%, Russia 4.1% 
Ukraine Russia 24.1%, Turkey 5.9%, Italy 4.7% 
U.K. U.S. 11.4%, Germany 11.2%, Netherlands 8.5%, France 7.7%, Ireland 6.8%, Belgium 5.4% 




Table 4.   Import partners by country. 
Country Import partners 
Australia China 18.7%, U.S. 11.1%, Japan 8.7%, Thailand 5.2%, Singapore 5.1%, Germany 5%, Malaysia 4.3% 
Belgium   Netherlands 19.1%, Germany 16.4%, France 11.3%, U.K. 5.4%, U.S. 5.3%, Ireland 5.3%, China 4.1% 
Brazil U.S. 15%, China 14.1%, Argentina 7.9%, Germany 6.9%, South Korea 4.6% 
Canada U.S. 50.4%, China 11%, Mexico 5.5% 
China Japan 12.6%, South Korea 9.9%, U.S. 7.3%, Germany 5.3%, Australia 4.3% 
Egypt U.S. 11.8%, China 10.4%, Germany 6.5%, Italy 6.4%, Saudi Arabia 4.1%  
France Germany 19.3%, Belgium 11.4%, Italy 8%, Netherlands 7.5%, Spain 6.8%, China 5.1%, U.K. 5% 
Germany Netherlands 13%, France 8.2%, Belgium 7.2%, China 6.8%, Italy 5.6%, U.K. 4.7%, Austria 4.4%, U.S. 4.2%, Switzerland 4.1% 
India China 12.4%, UAE 6.5%, Saudi Arabia 5.8%, U.S. 5.7%, Australia 4.5% 
Indonesia China 15.1%, Singapore 14.9%, Japan 12.5%, U.S. 6.9%, Malaysia 6.4%, South Korea 5.7%, Thailand 5.5% 
Italy Germany 16.2%, France 8.5%, China 7.9%, Netherlands 5.4%, Spain 4.5% 
Japan China 22.1%, U.S. 9.9%, Australia 6.5%, Saudi Arabia 5.2%, UAE 4.2%, South Korea 4.1%, Indonesia 4.1% 
Korea 
South 
China 17.9%, Japan 16.2%, U.S. 10.1%, Saudi Arabia 5.2%, Australia 
4.9% 
Malaysia China 12.6%, Japan 12.6%, Singapore 11.4%, U.S. 10.7%, Thailand 6.2%, Indonesia 5.6% 
Netherlands Germany 15.5%, China 12.6%, Belgium 8.3%, U.S. 6.8%, U.K. 6.2%, Russia 5.6% 
Norway Sweden 14.1%, Germany 12.4%, China 8.5%, Denmark 6.3%, U.K. 5.9%, U.S. 5.4% 
Pakistan UAE 16.3 %, Saudi Arabia 12.5 %, China 11.6 %, Kuwait 8.4 %, Singapore 7.1 %, Malaysia 5% 
Philippines Japan 14.1%, China 13.6%, U.S. 9.9%, Singapore 9.3%, Thailand 6.5%, South Korea 5.6%, Indonesia 4.1% 
Romania Germany 16.8%, Italy 11.6%, Hungary 8.7%, France 6%, China 5.5%, Russia 4.4%, Austria 4.1% 
Russia Germany 14.7%, China 13.5%, Ukraine 5.5%, Italy 4.7%, Belarus 4.5%  
Saudi 
Arabia 
U.S. 12.4%, China 11.1%, Germany 7.1%, Japan 6.9%, France 6.1%, 
India 4.7%, South Korea 4.2% 
Singapore South Africa 14.7%, China 10.7%, Malaysia 6.7%, U.S. 6.6%, U.K. 6.4%, Cote dIvoire 5.7%, India 4.8% 
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Country Import partners 
South 
Africa 
China 13.4%, Germany 11.2%, U.S. 7%, Saudi Arabia 5.3%, Japan 4.7%, 
Iran 4.3%, U.K. 4.3% 
Spain Germany 12.6%, France 11.5%, Italy 7.3%, China 6.8%, Netherlands 5.6%, U.K. 4.9% 
Sweden Germany 18.3%, Norway 8.5%, Denmark 8.3%, Netherlands 6.2%, U.K. 5.7%, Finland 5.4%, China 4.9%, Russia 4.9%, France 4.7% 
Turkey Russia 11.6%, Germany 9.5%, China 9.3%, U.S. 6.6%, Italy 5.5%, France 4.4%, Iran 4.1% 
Ukraine Russia 33.9%, China 8.5%, Germany 8.1%, Poland 5.4%, Belarus 4.1%  
U.K. Germany 13.1%, China 9.1%, Netherlands 7.5%, France 6.1%, U.S. 5.8%, Norway 5.5%, Belgium 4.9%  
U.S. China 19.5%, Canada 14.2%, Mexico 11.8%, Japan 6.3%, Germany 4.3% 
 
As shown in those tables, percentages of imports and exports for some countries 
are given. However, these percentages do not cover 100% of each country’s trading; thus, 
the missing fraction will be inferred using a gravity model (described below). 
With all the data processed as above, two matrices have been created: one for 
export percentages, and another for import percentages. An excerpt of these matrices is 
shown in Tables 5 and 6. Blanks indicate data are not available. 
Table 5.   Excerpt of approximated exports between countries (fraction). For example, 
Australia exports 25.1% of its volume to China. 
Exports Australia Belgium Brazil Canada China Egypt France Germany
Australia     0.251    
Belgium         0.170 0.191 
Brazil     0.152   0.040 
Canada         
China        0.043 
Egypt       0.047  
France  0.077      0.164 




Table 6.   Excerpt of approximated imports between countries (fraction). For example, 
Australia imports 18.7% of its volume from China. 
Imports Australia Belgium Brazil Canada China Egypt France Germany
Australia     0.187   0.050 
Belgium       0.041  0.113 0.164 
Brazil     0.141   0.069 
Canada     0.110    
China 0.043       0.053 
Egypt     0.104   0.065 
France  0.114   0.051   0.193 
Germany  0.072   0.068  0.082  
 
B. GRAVITY MODEL IN MARITIME TRADE 
A gravity model, as scientists refer to the modified Newton’s law of universal 
gravitation, is a method used to approximate certain behaviors that mimic gravitational 
interaction. A gravity model incorporates the idea that larger places attract more people, 
ideas, and commodities than do smaller places, and places closer together also have a 
greater attraction. 
Our gravity model of trade, applied to international commerce, estimates the flow 
of bilateral commerce based on population and distance between two countries. A similar 
model was first used by Tinbergen in 1962 to explain international bilateral trade (Nello, 
2009). The model has also been used to test the effectiveness of trade agreements and 
organizations such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the World Trade 
Organization. 
The basic theoretical model for trade between two countries (p and q) takes the 
form of: 
,p q P   countries 
ppop    population of country p [millions of people] 
,p qdist   shortest ocean distance between countries p and q [n.m.] 
 17 









     [3] 
where: 
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       [4] 
The population of each country included in this model has been obtained from the 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (United Nations, 2012). 
Table 7.   Population, latitude and longitude of countries included in our study 
Country Population      (in millions) Latitude Longitude 
Australia 22.268 -24.4213 140.1069 
Belgium 10.712 51.2747 3.8021 
Brazil 194.946 -25.2628 -47.6901 
Canada 34.017 49.2612 -123.1140 
China 1341.335 32.3459 119.1755 
Egypt 81.121 31.1261 29.8159 
France 62.787 48.6942 2.4279 
Germany 82.302 53.6263 9.3430 
India 1224.614 16.4117 83.0848 
Indonesia 239.871 -6.1178 106.8698 
Italy 60.551 43.5204 12.5651 
Japan 126.536 35.0270 136.8450 
Korea South 50.133 36.0483 128.6089 
Malasyia 28.401 2.1939 102.4929 
Netherlands 16.613 52.1417 4.7344 
Norway 4.883 60.3913 5.3221 
Pakistan 173.593 24.8934 67.0281 
Philippines 93.261 14.5995 120.9842 
Romania 21.486 44.1733 28.6383 
Russia 142.958 53.1790 29.2998 
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Country Population      (in millions) Latitude Longitude 
Saudi Arabia 27.448 24.2142 42.2965 
Singapore 5.086 1.3521 103.8198 
South Africa 50.133 -30.5483 27.0003 
Spain 46.077 40.2710 -1.0673 
Sweden 9.38 57.7089 11.9746 
Turkey 72.752 40.7760 29.9484 
U.K. 62.036 53.1333 -2.0137 
Ukraine 45.448 46.4846 30.7326 
U.S. 310.384 33.9800 -92.6375 
 
Table 7 shows the population and latitude and longitude of all the countries 
included in this study. In order to calculate the distances between countries, we use the 
following great circle formula (see, e.g., Wikipedia, 2012): 
 
 , = Earth radious arccos[sin(lat ) sin(lat ) + cos(lat ) cos(long long )]p q p q q q pdist    [5] 
Finally, the gravity level of each country is used to populate the import- and 
export-percentage matrices in those cases where there is no information available from 
the CIA’s website. See Tables 8 and 9. 
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Table 8.   Excerpt of complete export percentage matrix (fraction). Highlighted entries are based on CIA data. 
Export Australia Belgium  Brazil Canada China Egypt France Germany
Australia 0.000 0.004 0.017 0.008 0.251 0.012 0.009 0.011 
Belgium   0.002 0.000 0.008 0.004 0.024 0.017 0.170 0.191 
Brazil 0.010 0.011 0.000 0.017 0.152 0.028 0.026 0.040 
Canada 0.002 0.003 0.008 0.000 0.025 0.005 0.006 0.007 
China 0.009 0.005 0.010 0.009 0.000 0.015 0.012 0.043 
Egypt 0.004 0.013 0.016 0.006 0.053 0.000 0.047 0.036 
France 0.003 0.077 0.013 0.007 0.037 0.027 0.000 0.164 
Germany 0.002 0.052 0.010 0.006 0.047 0.022 0.101 0.000 
Table 9.   Excerpt of complete import percentage matrix (fraction). Highlighted entries are based on CIA data. 
Import Australia Belgium  Brazil Canada China Egypt France Germany
Australia 0.000 0.004 0.017 0.008 0.187 0.012 0.009 0.050
Belgium   0.002 0.000 0.007 0.004 0.041 0.015 0.113 0.164
Brazil 0.009 0.009 0.000 0.015 0.141 0.025 0.023 0.069
Canada 0.005 0.005 0.016 0.000 0.110 0.011 0.012 0.015
China 0.043 0.006 0.012 0.010 0.000 0.018 0.014 0.053
Egypt 0.004 0.012 0.015 0.006 0.104 0.000 0.029 0.065
France 0.002 0.114 0.011 0.006 0.051 0.023 0.000 0.193
Germany 0.002 0.072 0.009 0.005 0.068 0.021 0.082 0.000
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The export datum of every country is then applied to the outgoing cargo volume 
of every port in a given country, in order to build a new matrix of cargo exports 
containing cargo volumes by port (in thousands of tons), instead of percentages by 
country. The same procedure allows us to build a matrix of cargo imports.  
Because our model needs one matrix of demand, we calculate an average of the 
import and export values. We note that these two matrices need not to be identical, 
because we are combining data from different sources. 
As a result, we obtain a matrix of 120 by 120 demands containing data of 
incoming cargo volumes, which we use in our model. The values of demand were 
originally expressed in thousands of tons per year; however, in our model, we convert 
them into tons per day. 
C. ROUTES 
The 120 ports constitute the initial set of nodes in our network. We add 35 
waypoints at sea where necessary to change the trajectories of the great-circle routes to 
avoid mainlands. The list of additional nodes (waypoints) included in our network model, 
along with their latitude and longitude, is shown in Table 10. 
For example, in order to allow tracing a route from the port of Hay Point, on the 
east coast of Australia, to the port of Hedland, on the west coast, the nodes of Horn Land 
and Darwin have been created, as shown in Figure 3. 
Naturally, all waypoints are transshipment nodes, with no own supply or demand 







Table 10.   Additional waypoint nodes included in the network model 
Waypoint name Closest country Latitude Longitude 
Aden Yemen 11.1784 45.6152
BandaAceh Indonesia 6.1406 94.9219
BosphorusN Turkey 41.3768 29.2181
BosphorusS Turkey 40.7847 28.8940
BrazilGroup Brazil -25.1652 -41.6602
Brest France 48.8069 -5.4053




Corunna Spain 43.8345 -9.8438
Crete Greece 35.2097 26.4771
Dakar Senegal 14.6048 -18.8086
Darwin Australia -10.4878 131.0889
GibraltarE Spain 36.7741 -0.0439
GibraltarW Spain 35.6037 -10.4590
HornIsland Australia -10.0013 142.5696
ItalyHeel Italy 39.7410 19.0283
Jeju South Korea 33.8522 126.5845
LombokN Bali -7.6021 116.0596
LombokS Bali -9.3840 115.6421
Magellan Argentina -57.1362 -67.9834
Messina Italy 38.0438 15.5841
Myrina Greece 39.5379 25.2246
Natal Brazil -5.3535 -34.0137
NorthSea Denmark 56.7527 5.4492
Oman Oman 23.4028 61.2158
PanamaE Panama 10.3582 -79.4971
PanamaW Panama 4.3026 -82.2656
Socotra Somalia 12.9403 54.6680
SriLanka Sri Lanka 6.1406 78.5742
SuezN Egypt 31.8216 32.2119
SuezS Egypt 28.9793 32.7832
SundaE Indonesia -4.8283 108.0615
SundaW Indonesia -7.1881 103.9307
USEastGroup U.S. 38.4106 -70.4004




Figure 3.   Waypoints Darwin and HornIland added to allow tracing sea 
routes. 
Starting with the selected nodes (ports and waypoints), we create a number of arcs 
so all ports are connected. Each arc assumes the shortest great-circle distance between 
two nodes. To create the arcs, the world map is divided into seven zones: 
 
1. North America, 
2. South America, 
3. Europe, 
4. Southeast Asia and Oceania, 
5. Central and Southwest Asia, 
6. Korea and Japan, and 
7. Africa. 
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Figures 4 to 10 show the routes in each zone of the world map. A total of 416 




Figure 4.   Arcs in North American zone 
 24 
 
Figure 5.   Arcs in South American zone 
 
Figure 6.   Arcs in European zone 
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Figure 7.   Arcs in Southeast Asian and Oceania zone 
 
 
Figure 8.   Arcs in Central and Southwest Asian zone 
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Figure 9.   Arcs in Southeast Asian zone 
 
Figure 10.   Arcs in African zone 
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In addition to waypoints in the open sea, we also create some waypoints that 
connect nearby ports. The purpose of this is to simplify tracing the routes. An example is 
the USEast Group and the USSouth Group, as shown on the North American map of arcs 
in Figures 11 and 12. 
 
 
Figure 11.   USEast Group node 
 
Figure 12.   USSouth Group node 
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In areas where there are several small islands, an arc may traverse land (e.g., from 
Horn Island to Manila). We have ensured that these discrepancies compared to the actual 
sea routes are negligible. 
The list of 416 arcs is shown in the Appendix, which contains a table with the 
distance between the origin and destination of each arc, expressed in n.m. and calculated 
using the same great-circle distance formula (5). 
In addition to distance, another attribute associated with an arc is its capacity. 
This is the maximum amount of cargo that can be transported on the arc during a day. We 
consider that all arcs have infinite capacity, with the exception of the Panama Canal. 
According to research by the Panama Canal Authority (2012), its maximum capacity is 
between 280 to 290 million tons per year. This capacity includes cargo transported in 
both ways of circulation. In our model, we use half that capacity for each direction, which 
means 140-million tons annually or 384-thousand tons daily. 
A general view of all arcs in the model is shown in Figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 13.   General view of all arcs in the model 
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D. INTERDICTION PENALTIES 
Any arc that is subject to interdiction has a “penalty distance,” which reflects the 
need to reroute ships in order to avoid the threat.  
Notice that when an arc is interdicted, our model only considers the rerouting of 
the cargo through another available maritime route, which does not account for the 
potential use a different transportation means (truck, rail or air), or nearby port. 
The criteria used to determine the penalty distance when an arc is interdicted 
depends on the geographical characteristics of the area. As a general rule, it is assumed 
that for longer arcs and arcs farther away from shore, the area of threat is bigger than for 
those that are short and close to shore. For this reason, their associated penalties (if 
interdicted) are longer. Some special cases, such as straits and canals, are analyzed 
independently.  
In cases where an arc traverses open sea, it is assumed that the route must be 
deviated to avoid a zone that extends 400 n.m. beyond each side of the original arc’s 
route. For the purpose of this work, it is assumed that the position of the threat is known. 
Assuming that the vessel begins deviation maneuvers 750 n.m. before the threat zone and 
recovers the original route 750 n.m. after the threat zone, a penalty of 200 n.m. is the 
additional distance that the vessel should travel to avoid the lateral 400 n.m. of the threat 
zone.  




Figure 14.   Deviation maneuvers in open sea 
In the case of arcs with lengths of under 100 n.m., or when their distance from 
shore is no more than 50 n.m. (this usually occurs between ports of the same country) the 
additional distance used is 50 n.m., with the exception of straits and canals.  
In the case of arcs between 100 and 300 n.m. long, the penalty is 100 n.m. (if 
those arcs do not use coastal routes). For arcs with a length between 300 and 1,500 n.m., 
the penalty is 150 n.m. 
A special case is when the arc traverses a strait or canal: here, the penalty is 
assumed to be “infinite.” This means that the arc and nearby routes will be closed, and 
other available routes (based solely on existing arcs) must be used. For the purpose of this 
work, the canals and straits considered under this situation are: Bab-el-Mandeb, 
Bosphorus, Gibraltar, Hormuz, Lombok, Malacca, Panama, Suez and Sunda.  
The value of penalties for each arc is shown on the list of arcs in the Appendix. In 
our calculation, a penalty value equal to the sum of all arc lengths is used (instead of 
infinity) for straits and canals. 
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III. MULTI-COMMODITY NETWORK INTERDICTION 
MODEL 
We model our maritime-transportation problem using a network with 155 nodes, 
of which 120 are ports and 35 are waypoints, with 416 arcs. It is assumed that we need to 
carry goods from every port to every other port. We tag each demand by port of origin, 
which we call “commodity.” Thus, our defender’s (operator’s) problem is a capacitated, 
multi-commodity, minimum cost-flow model (Ahuja et al., 1993, pp. 294-344). 
Our first goal is to estimate the minimum daily “transportation cost” of the global 
cargo shipment. Let us define this “cost” as the product of cargo volume carried (in tons) 
times the distance traveled by the cargo (in n.m.). We solve this problem under normal 
operating conditions, that is, in the absence of interdictions. Then, we develop an 
interdiction model of the flow in the network.  
A. OPERATOR MODEL 
The operator’s problem is to route all cargo in the network in a manner that 
satisfies all supplies, demands, and capacities and incurs the lowest total transportation 
cost. 
1. Mathematical Formulation 
Let ( , )G I A be a directed network with node set I and arc set A . We use the 
following notation to formulate the operator model: 
 
Indices and index sets: 
I  set of nodes, for ,i j I  
A  set of arcs, for ( , )i j A  
C  set of commodities, for c C . Note: One distinct commodity originates at 
every port node. 
 
Data [units]: 
ijt   distance from node i  to node j [n.m.] 
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iju   capacity of arc ( , )i j  [1000 × tons]  
cid   demand of commodity c  at node i  [1000 × tons]  
cis   supply of commodity c  at node i  [1000 × tons]. Note: Supply is zero, 
except for one commodity at each port node. 
 
Decision variables [units]: 
cijX  flow of commodity c on arc ( , )i j [1000 × tons] 
 
Operator model formulation: 
( , )
min ij cijX c i j A
t X

           [6] 
 
Subject to: 
|( , ) |( , )
     ,   cji cij ci ci
j i j A j i j A
X X d s c i
 
    
     
[7a] 
      ( , )cij ij
c
X u i j A           [7b] 
0      , ( , )cijX c i j A           [7c]
 
2. Discussion 
The objective function (6) in the operator model calculates the total transportation 
cost. Constraint (7a) ensures balance of flow for all nodes and commodities. Constraint 
(7b) ensures that the flow on arc (i, j) does not exceed the capacity of arc (i, j). In our 
data, only the two directions of the Panama Canal have such a restriction (i.e., for all 
other arcs, uij = ∞). Finally, constraint (7c) ensures non-negative flow.  
B. INTERDICTION MODEL 
Let n be the number of arcs an attacker (or group of attackers) can interdict. We 
assume that each interdiction blocks the interdicted arc completely, so the full penalty 
discussed in Section II.D is applied to any traffic using the arc. Recall that this penalty 
reflects the additional distance required to travel around the arc, or an “infinite” penalty if 
that possibility does not exist. We also assume that, for any interdiction, both directions 
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of circulation are affected. Our AD model determines the set of n arcs to interdict that 
maximizes the resulting minimum flow cost in the network. 
1. Mathematical Formulation 
The AD model uses the following additional notation and formulation:  
Data [units]: 
ijp   penalty for using interdicted arc ( , )i j  [n.m.]  
n   number of interdictions [interdictions] 
 
Decision variables [units]: 
ijY   1 if arc ( , )i j  is interdicted, 0 otherwise [binary] 
ci   dual of balance of flow for commodity c  at node i  [n.m.] 
ij   dual of capacity on arc ( , )i j  [n.m.] 
 
AD model formulation (max-min): 
( , )
max min ( )ij ij ij cijXY c i j A
t p Y X

        [8] 
Subject to:       (Dual) 
|( , ) |( , )
     ,   cji cij ci ci
j j i A j i j A
X X d s c i
 
    
  
 ( )ci   [9a] 
      ( , )cij ij
c
X u i j A  
     
( )ij   [9b]
 







         [9d] 
       ( , ) |ij jiY Y i j A i j           [9e] 
 0,1      ( , )ijY i j A          [9f] 
 
AD model formulation (max-max): 
, , ( , )
max ( )ci ci ci ij ijY c i i j A




( )     , ( , )   cj ci ij ij ij ijt p Y c i j A             [11a] 
0     ( , )ij i j A            [11b] 
 unrestricted     ,  ci c i         [11c] 
(9d), (9e), (9f) 
2. Discussion 
The objective function (8) is similar to (6) in the operator model, with the 
exception that we introduce a penalty ijp  if the arc (i,j) is interdicted. Constraints (9a), 
(9b) and (9c) are the same as in the operator model. 
Constraint (9d) ensures that n arcs are interdicted. Note that interdicting n arcs is 
modeled as 2n interdictions, because whenever arc (i,j) is interdicted, arc (j,i) must also 
be interdicted. Constraint (9e) ensures this is the case. Constraint (9f) ensures that 
interdictions are modeled as binary variables. 
Because the objective of the attacker is to maximize the resulting minimum 
operator’s cost, the max-min structure in (8) does not allow us to solve this AD model as 
a standard optimization problem. Thus, we take the dual of the inner minimization model, 
which results in the equivalent formulation (10) – (11c), in addition to constraints (9d), 
(9e), (9f) on the Y variables. The duals of constraints (9a) and (9b) become decision 
variables ci  and ci  in the reformulation. 
We may manually set an arc to be interdicted or non-interdictable (defended) by 
fixing the value of variable ijY  to 1 or 0, respectively. This allows us to study the 
consequences of interdicting a pre-specified arc or group of arcs, or to model a scenario 





This model has been implemented in the Generic Algebraic Modeling Software 
(GAMS, 2012). 
A typical instance of our AD problem has approximately 19,400 decision 
variables of which 416 are binary (one for each interdictable arc), and 50,000 constraints. 
All of our instances (shown in the next chapter) solve in less than 10 seconds on a 
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IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. BASELINE SCENARIO: GLOBAL SHIPMENT WITHOUT 
INTERDICTIONS 
The first result that we obtain by running our operator model is the transportation 
cost of the total cargo shipment without interdictions; that is, the “normal” maritime 
traffic using the shortest routes (except as limited by arc capacities) with no threat. The 
transportation cost for this baseline scenario is 92.5 billions of ton-n.m. per day. This 
value does not represent the actual cost of the global maritime-cargo shipment, because 
our model considers only the 120 most important ports; however, it is useful as a 
reference when comparing the same network with interdictions.  
In terms of monetary cost, assuming an average operating cost of $0.002 for the 
transport of one ton over one nautical mile, the daily cost of maritime transportation 
(considering only the movement of the 120 most important ports) would be 
$180.1 million. 
Table 11 shows the daily flows (considering both ways of transportation) in the 
arcs at canals and straits considered as possible bottlenecks in our model.  
Table 11.   Baseline Scenario: Daily flows in the arcs for selected canals and straits 
Arc (both directions) Strait or canal Flow             (tons × 1000) 
(Ma_TanjungPelepas, Si_Singapore) Malacca 4,906
(Ma_Kelang, Ma_TanjungPelepas) Malacca 4,773
(GibraltarW, Sp_Algeciras) Gibraltar 4,035
(Sp_Algeciras, GibraltarE) Gibraltar 4,028
(Sa_Jeddah, Aden) Bab-el-Mandeb 3,914
(SuezN, SuezS) Suez 3,829
(BosphorusN, BosphorusS) Bosphorus 818
(PanamaW, PanamaE) Panama 768
(SundaE, SundaW) Sunda 585
(Sa_Jubail, Oman) Hormuz 133
(LombokN, LombokS) Lombok 29
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The flow in the Panama Canal reaches its maximum capacity in both directions. 
According to our model, if the canal had no capacity limit, the daily flow in the Panama 
Canal would be 1,820 thousand tons. 
Flows in Bosphorus, Sunda, Hormuz and Lombok straits are much lower than in 
the others straits or canals. However, as discussed below, they become important when 
considering scenarios with interdictions.   
B. ONE-INTERDICTION SCENARIOS 
In this section we present our analysis for cases where only one arc is interdicted, 
that is, n=1. 
1. Scenario 1: Single Arc Interdiction and Arcs Not Defended  
If we assume that any arc can be attacked, the optimal solution is an attack on the 
arc (BosphorusN, BosphorusS) in the Strait of Bosphorus. The reason for this solution 
(see Figure 6) is that by closing this strait, the ports of Constantza (Romania), Odessa 
(Ukraine), and Novorossisk (Russia) become isolated: all of them are on the coast of the 
Black Sea with no other way to ship their cargo by sea. Therefore, rather than an increase 
in distance traveled, this situation incurs unmet demand. 
The Strait of Bosphorus is one of the arcs whose penalty is assumed to be infinite. 
In practice, the actual cost for this interdiction should be calculated by rerouting the cargo 
by train or truck to the nearest port outside the Black Sea, but such analysis is beyond the 
purpose of this thesis. If this strait is closed, a daily flow of 818 thousand tons (in both 
directions) would be interrupted. 
The same consideration applies for the arc (Sa_Jubail, Oman) in the Strait of 
Hormuz (see Figure 8). In closing this strait, the port of Jubail (Saudi Arabia) becomes 
isolated, so a daily flow of 133 thousand tons (in both directions) remains interrupted. 
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In order to avoid these isolated instances, we set those arcs as defended (i.e., 
invulnerable), by fixing ijY  to 0 for arcs (i,j) equal to (BosphorusN, BosphorusS) and 
(Sa_Jubail, Oman). 
Running our AD model with the above provision, the optimal attack becomes 
(GibraltarW, Sp_Algeciras) in the Strait of Gibraltar. This interdiction causes a rerouting 
of the global shipment with a daily transportation cost of 115.3 billions of ton-n.m., 
which represents an increment of 24.65% with respect to the cost without interdictions. 
As we observe in Figures 6 and 10, in order to maintain the flow of cargo between the 
west and east sides of Gibraltar, that flow must be rerouted using available routes around 
the south of Africa. These new routes require traveling long distances that, in turn, incur a 
large increment in cost.  
Assuming again an operating cost of $0.002 per ton-n.m., and considering only 
the 120 most important ports, the global maritime traffic cost when Gibraltar is closed 
would be $230.7 million. Thus, the additional daily cost due to rerouting would be 
$45.6 million. 
2. Scenario 2: Single Arc Interdiction and Defended Arcs 
Suppose that we allocate defense forces to protect the Strait of Gibraltar  
from interdiction. We wish to know which other interdicted arc would cause the next-
worst disruption to our maritime flow. To analyze this situation, we set the arc 
(GibraltarW, Sp_Algeciras) as defended and run our interdiction model keeping n=1.   
The solution for this case consist of an interdiction on the arc (Sp_Algeciras, 
GibraltarE), which also blocks any flow in the Strait of Gibraltar (see Figure 6). 
Therefore, we have almost the same result as in Scenario 1, except for the difference  





If we defend the two arcs in and out of the Strait of Gibraltar, the solution shows 
that the next arc to be interdicted is (Sa_Jeddah, Aden) in the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb 
(also known as Mandab Strait), connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden (see Figures 
8 and 10). The total closure of this strait causes a rerouting of the global shipment 
resulting in a daily transportation cost of 110 billions of ton-n.m., which is an increment  
of 19.79% with respect to the cost without interdiction. As in the case of the Gibraltar 
Strait, a blockade of this strait also forces all cargo originally in the area to reroute around 
the south of Africa. 
The economic cost when Bab-el-Mandeb Strait is closed would be $221.7 million 
and the additional daily cost due to rerouting would be $45.6 million. 
Following this mechanism we obtain a ranking of the twelve most costly arc 
interdictions, provided that a single arc is attacked at a time. Table 12 shows the list of 
arc interdictions, along with the figures that show the arc location, daily transportation 














Table 12.   Ranking of most costly single arc interdictions  
(excluding cases with isolated ports) 
 Interdicted arc (i,j) Fig. Transportation cost     (billions of ton-n.m.) 
Relative 
increment (%) 
0 No interdictions - 92.5 - 
1 (GibraltarW, Sp_Algeciras) 6, 10 115.3 24.65
2 (Sp_Algeciras, GibraltarE) 6,10 114.9 24.19
3 (Sa_Jeddah,         Aden) 8, 10 110.8 19.79
4 (SuezN,               SuezS) 8, 10 109.8 18.70
5 (PanamaW,   PanamaE) 4, 5 99.6 7.66
6 (Ma_TanjungPelepas, Si_Singapore) 7 98.0 5.96
7 (Ma_Kelang, Ma_TanjungPelepas) 7 97.6 5.53
8 (Socotra,          SriLanka) 8 93.2 0.75
9 (Ma_Kelang, BandaAceh) 7 93.2 0.75
10 (SriLanka, BandaAceh) 7, 8 93.2 0.67
11 (Aden,               Socotra) 8 93.1 0.63




In Figure 15, we observe a comparative chart of the relative cost increment due to 
rerouting for the twelve most costly single-arc interdictions. For better understanding, we 
have replaced the names of actual arcs with the names of the geographical areas where 
the arcs are located. 
 
 
Figure 15.   Relative cost increment due to rerouting for the twelve most 
costly single-arc interdictions (excluding cases with isolated 
ports) 
After the interdictions of the Strait of Gibraltar and the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, 
the next-worst interdiction corresponds to the arc (SuezN, SuezS) in the Suez Canal, 
connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea, causing a relative cost increment of 
18.70%. The cause of this increment is, again, an increase in the traveled distance. 
The next worst-case interdiction is the arc (PanamaW, PanamaE) in the Panama 
Canal, causing a cost increment of 7.66%, which is significantly lower than in the 
previous cases. Despite the long rerouting needed around the south of South America, the 
amount of cargo involved is not as important as in the above cases, because the flow 
through the Panama Canal under normal conditions is relatively low due to its limited 
capacity.  
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The next two single interdictions in the ranking correspond to the arcs 
(Ma_TanjungPelepas, Si_Singapore) and (Ma_Kelang, Ma_TanjungPelepas) in the 
Malacca Strait, with cost increments of 5.96% and 5.53%, respectively. In these cases, 
the cost increment is due to the large amount of cargo to be rerouted, rather than the 
length of the new route. In fact, the flows on those arcs are the highest (see Table 11); 
thus, a relatively short rerouting using arcs surrounding the Sumatra Island causes a large 
cost increase.  
The rest of the interdictions in the chart show a lower impact on global traffic, 
with cost increments below 1%. Note that, unlike previous interdictions, an attack on 
those arcs does not imply a total closure of the arc, but a certain penalty length (i.e., 50, 
100, 150 or 200 n.m.). 
Interdicted arcs in dashed, thicker line (except in the Panama Canal and Strait of 
Gibraltar) are shown in Figures 16 and 17. Figure 18 shows each interdicted arc with a 
label indicating its position in the ranking.  
 
 




Figure 17.   Scenario 2: Detailed view of interdicted arcs in Southeast 
Asia 
 
Figure 18.   Scenarios 1 and 2: All interdicted arcs with ranking position 




C. MULTIPLE INTERDICTION SCENARIOS 
In this section we analyze scenarios where two or three simultaneous interdictions 
are possible. 
1. Scenario 3: Two-Arc Interdiction and Arcs Not Defended 
We first assume n=2 and any arc can be attacked. The optimal solution for this 
scenario is an attack on the arcs (GibraltarW, Sp_Algeciras) and (Sa_Jeddah, Aden). 
Closure of the Strait of Gibraltar and the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb causes the isolation of 
all the ports in the Mediterranean Sea and Red Sea from the rest of the ports (see Figures 
6, 8 and 10). This case, similar to the closure of the Straits of Bosphorus and Hormuz 
explained above, is a case of unmet demand, because there are no alternative routes to 
trade outside the isolated area. Therefore, rerouting costs associated with this interdiction 
are not analyzed.  
Table 13 shows the pair of arcs whose simultaneous interdiction causes the 
isolation of one or more ports.   
Table 13.   Scenario 3: Pairs of arcs whose simultaneous interdiction causes  
the isolation of one or more ports 
Pair of interdicted arcs  Isolated ports 
(GibraltarW, Sp_Algeciras) and           
(Sa_Jeddah, Aden) Ports in Mediterranean Sea and Red Sea 
(GibraltarW, Sp_Algeciras) and                
(SuezN, SuezS) Ports in Mediterranean Sea 
(SuezN, SuezS) and                            
(Sa_Jeddah, Aden) Ports in Red Sea 
(GibraltarW, Sp_Algeciras) and      
(Sp_Algeciras, GibraltarE) Port of Algeciras (Spain) 
(Ma_Kelang, Ma_TanjungPelepas) and 
(Ma_TanjungPelepas, Si_Singapore) Port of Tanjung Pelepas (Malaysia) 
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Assuming that no isolation interdictions will take place, the optimal solution for 
two simultaneous interdictions is an attack on arcs (GibraltarW, Sp_Algeciras) in the 
Mediterranean Sea and (PanamaW, PanamaE) in the Panama Canal. The rerouting 
derived from this attack would cause a daily transportation cost of 123.3 billions of ton-
n.m., which implies an increment of 33.22% with respect to the cost without 
interdictions. The monetary daily cost of these interdictions would be $246.5 million, and 
the additional daily cost due to rerouting would be $61.5 million. 
The second-worst simultaneous interdiction corresponds to arcs (GibraltarW, 
Sp_Algeciras) and (Ma_TanjungPelepas, Si_Singapore) in the Strait of Malacca. These 
interdictions would cause a daily transportation cost of 118.8 billions of ton-n.m., that is, 
an increment of 28.44% with respect to the cost without interdictions. The monetary daily 
cost of these attacks would be $237.7 million, and the additional daily cost due to 
rerouting would be $52.6 million. 
Other near-optimal simultaneous interdictions would correspond to arcs 
(Sa_Jeddah, Aden) and (PanamaW, PanamaE), with an increment of 28.35%, and 
(SuezN, SuezS) and (PanamaW, PanamaE), with an increment of 27.27%. 
The relative cost increments for these paired interdictions are shown in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19.   Scenario 3: Relative cost increment for two simultaneous 
interdictions (excluding cases with isolated ports) 
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2. Scenario 4: Two-Arc Interdiction and Defended Arcs in Gibraltar, 
Suez and Panama  
Perhaps a more realistic scenario would consist of assuming the arcs in the Strait 
of Gibraltar, Suez Canal and Panama Canal are well-defended. Table 14 shows a list of 
the alternative n=2 interdictions, along with the daily transportation cost, and the relative 
cost increment due to rerouting.  
Table 14.   Scenario 4: Pairs of interdictions, assuming Strait of Gibraltar,  
Suez Canal and Panama Canal are defended 
 
Pair of interdicted arcs Transportation cost    (billions of ton-n.m.) 
Relative cost 
increment (%) 
0 No interdictions 92.5 - 
1 




2 (Sa_Jeddah, Aden) and                 (Dakar,  So_SaldanhaBay)  111.6 20.60
3 (Sa_Jeddah, Aden) and          (GibraltarW, Dakar) 111.4 20.44
4 (Sa_Jeddah, Aden) and                 (SundaW, SundaE) 111.4 20.38
5 (Sa_Jeddah, Aden) and      (Si_Singapore, SundaE) 111.3 20.32
6 (Sa_Jeddah, Aden) and       (RichardsBay, SundaW) 111.3 20.25
 
The optimal solution for this scenario is the simultaneous interdiction of the arcs 
(Sa_Jeddah, Aden) and (Ma_TanjungPelepas, Si_Singapore) located in the Strait of Bab 
el Mandeb and the Strait of Malacca, respectively.  
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Other pairs of interdictions in this ranking include: the arc in the Strait of Bab el 
Mandeb and the arcs (Dakar, So_SaldanhaBay) and (GibraltarW, Dakar) on the west 
coast of Africa; and the arc (RichardsBay, SundaW) on the east of Africa. These arcs 
around Africa increase considerably in flow if some of the arcs in the Strait of Gibraltar, 
Suez Canal or the Strait of Bab el Mandeb are closed, because they take most of the flow 
that normally traverses the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea. For this reason, they also 
become attractive targets.  
Figure 20 shows a comparative chart of the relative cost increment due to 




Figure 20.   Scenario 4: Relative cost increment due to rerouting for the six most costly two-arc interdictions 
assuming Strait of Gibraltar, Suez Canal and Panama Canal are defended 
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The Strait of Bab el Mandeb becomes the most critical region in this scenario 
because it is present in every pair of arc interdictions. The arcs around Africa are also 
important because of their increasing flow. Other arcs playing an important role in this 
scenario are those in the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Sunda, located around the 
Indonesian island of Sumatra.  
3. Scenario 5: Two-Arc Interdiction and Defended Arcs in Gibraltar, 
Suez, Panama and Bab el Mandeb  
Let us analyze a new scenario in which we assume that, besides the Strait of 
Gibraltar, Suez Canal, and Panama Canal, the Strait of Bab el Mandeb is also well-
defended. We maintain n=2 interdictions. With these assumptions, interdictions will 
focus on the arcs in the Southeast of Asia region. 
The optimal solution for this scenario is a simultaneous attack on the arcs 
(Ma_TanjungPelepas, Si_Singapore) and (SundaW, SundaE) in the straits of Malacca and 
Sunda, which cause a relative cost increment of 8.27%. The next most costly arc 
interdictions are shown in Table 15. 
Table 15.   Scenario 5: Pairs of interdictions, assuming the Strait of Gibraltar,  
Suez Canal and Panama Canal and Strait of Bab el Mandeb are defended 
 
Pair of interdicted arcs Transportation cost    (billions of ton-n.m.) 
Relative cost 
increment (%) 
0 No interdictions 92.5 - 
1 (Ma_TanjungPelepas, Si_Singapore) and (SundaW, SundaE) 100.2 8.27
2 (Ma_TanjungPelepas, Si_Singapore) and (SriLanka, SundaW) 98.9 6.89
3 (Ma_TanjungPelepas, Si_Singapore) and (Si_Singapore, SundaE) 98.9 6.88
4 (Ma_TanjungPelepas, Si_Singapore) and (Socotra, SriLanka) 98.7 6.71
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5 (Ma_TanjungPelepas, Si_Singapore) and (Aden, Socotra) 98.6 6.59
6 (Ma_TanjungPelepas, Si_Singapore) and (SuezS, Sa_Yanbu) 98.6 6.58
 
Figures 21 and Figure 22 show the interdicted arcs in dashed, thicker line. Note 
that the Strait of Malacca is present in every pair of interdictions. This is an indicator of 
the importance of this strait. 
Figure 23, shows the relative cost increments, due to rerouting, for the six most 
costly arc interdictions in this scenario.  
 
 









Figure 23.   Scenario 5: Relative cost increment for two-arc interdictions 
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4. Scenario 6: Three-Arc Interdiction and Defended Arcs in Gibraltar, 
Suez, Panama and Bab el Mandeb  
For this scenario, the arcs in the straits of Gibraltar and Bab el Mandeb, and 
canals of Panama and Suez remain well defended, but now three interdictions are allowed 
(n=3). The optimal solution given by our AD model shows optimal interdictions at 
(Ma_TanjungPelepas, Si_Singapore), (SundaW, SundaE) and (LombokN, LombokS), in 
the straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok, respectively (see Figure 24). All these straits 
are controlled by only one country, and their closure has the effect of a barrier along 
Sumatra Island, Java Island, and the group of small islands east of Java.  
If these arcs are interdicted, the daily transportation cost would be 106.9 billions 
of ton-n.m., meaning an increment of 15.54% with respect to the cost without 
interdictions. The daily monetary cost would be $213.8 million and the additional daily 
cost due to rerouting would be $28.7 million. 
 
 
Figure 24.   Scenario 6: Interdicted arcs assuming three interdictions and 
the straits of Gibraltar and Bab el Mandeb, and canals of 
Panama and Suez defended 
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5. Scenario 7: Two-arc and three-arc interdiction and defended arcs in 
Gibraltar, Suez, Panama, Bab el Mandeb, and Malacca 
Let us consider a final scenario where we add another defense in the Strait of 
Malacca, in addition to the defenses in Scenarios 5 and 6. 
The optimal solution for two-arc interdictions (n=2) corresponds to the arcs 
(Socotra, SriLanka) and (BandaAceh, Ma_Kelang) with a daily transportation cost of 
93.9 billions of ton-n.m., which represents an increment of 1.5% with respect to the cost 
without interdictions. This is significantly lower than the 8.27% cost increase of Scenario 
5, where the Strait of Malaca is not included in the set of defenses.  
In case that three-arc interdictions are allowed (n=3), the arcs (Socotra, SriLanka), 
(SriLanka, BandaAceh) and (BandaAceh, Ma_Kelang) become the optimal solution, with 
a daily transportation cost of 94.5 billions of ton-n.m., and a cost increment of 2.17%. 
Again, this significantly reduces the 15.54% cost increase of Scenario 6. 
For two-arc interdictions, the daily monetary costs would be $187.8 million and 
the additional daily cost due to rerouting would be $2.8 million. The corresponding costs 
for three-arc interdictions would be $189.1 billion and $4.0 billion respectively. 
6. Summary Comparisons 
Figure 25 compares the relative cost increments corresponding to the closure of 
the Strait of Malacca only, the closure of the straits of Malacca and Sunda and the closure 
of the straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok, along with the single interdiction of the 
Straits of Gibraltar and Bab el Mandeb and the canals of Suez and Panama. 
The action of a triple simultaneous attack notably increases the cost of maritime 
transport which is higher than the increment caused by the closure of the Panama Canal 
and slightly lower than the increments caused by the closure of the Strait of Bab el 




Figure 25.   Comparative chart of cost increment caused by interdictions 
in Gibraltar; Bab el Mandeb; Suez; Panama; Malacca; Malacca 
and Sunda; and Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok.  
Figure 26, shows the relative cost increment for one-arc and two-arc optimal 
interdictions, for the following defended arcs: Gibraltar; Gibraltar and Bab el Mandeb; 
Gibraltar, Bab el Mandeb and Suez; Gibraltar, Bab el Mandeb, Suez and Panama; and 
Gibraltar, Bab el Mandeb, Suez, Panama and Malacca. 
 
 
Figure 26.   Cost increment for one-arc interdiction and two-arc 
interdiction, for several sets of defended arcs  
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A notable reduction in cost increment is observed when the five straits and canals 
are defended. 
The associated optimal solution (interdicted arcs) for every set of defenses in 
Figure 26 is shown in Table 16. 
Table 16.   Interdicted arcs for every set of defended straits and canals 
Defended strait/canal Interdicted arcs          (One-arc interdiction) 
Interdicted arcs             
(Two-arc interdictions) 
Gibraltar (Sa_Jeddah, Aden) (Sa_Jeddah, Aden) and (PanamaE, PanamaW) 
Gibraltar and Bab el Mandeb (SuezN, SuezS) (SuezN, SuezS) and (PanamaE, PanamaW) 
Gibraltar, Bab el Mandeb 
and Suez (PanamaE, PanamaW) 
(PanamaE, PanamaW) and 
(Ma_TanjungPelepas, 
Si_Singapore) 
Gibraltar, Bab el Mandeb, 




Si_Singapore) and (SundaE, 
SundaW) 
Gibraltar, Bab el Mandeb, 
Suez, Panama and Malacca (Socotra, SriLanka) 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
We have built a maritime network model to approximate sea routes for worldwide 
transportation of commodities. We propose an AD model to identify geographical points 
at sea whose interdiction may cause the largest deviation of cargo flow from the original 
routes. 
The network contains 120 nodes representing the 120 most important ports in the 
world (based on volume of cargo), 35 waypoint nodes at sea, and 416 arcs to interconnect 
all the ports. The interdiction of an arc incurs a penalty equivalent to the additional 
distance that we estimate ships would need to travel in order to avoid the threat. In cases 
of straits and canals we assume a total blockade of the sea lane, forcing the model to seek 
alternative routes of transportation.  
The information to populate the model has been obtained from different sources. 
Unfortunately, we have not found precise information for supply and demand at every 
port. Instead, we have used:  
(a) total volume handled by the port,  
(b) trade balance of the country where the port is located,  
(c) import and export rates between pairs of countries, and  
(d) a gravity model,  
as surrogates for estimating:  
(i) the total supply available from each port (which is defined as a distinct 
commodity), and  
(ii) the demand of each commodity at each port. 
 
By running our AD model, we analyze several scenarios that vary depending on 
the set of arcs we assume are defended and the number of simultaneous interdictions 
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allowed for the attacker. For every scenario we elaborate a ranking of the worst-case 
interdictions, identify the interdicted arcs, and calculate their costs, measured in ton-n.m. 
Excluding interdictions that cause the isolation of a port, we find that the 
interdiction (and closure) of the Strait of Gibraltar alone generates the largest disruption 
with a cost increase of 24.65% with respect to the non-interdicted network. We identify 
other important isolated attacks in the Strait of Bab el Mandeb (cost increase of 19.79%), 
Suez Canal (18.70%), Panama Canal (7.66%), and Strait of Malacca (5.96%). In some of 
these cases, the interdiction is explained by the increase in distance the cargo would need 
to travel, whereas in other cases the predominant factor is the amount of cargo involved. 
For two simultaneous interdictions we discover several cases which would also 
isolate regions from any maritime transportation. Excluding those cases, we observe that 
the interdiction of the Panama Canal and the Strait of Gibraltar produce the largest cost 
increment of 33.22%.  When the Panama and Suez canals, and the Strait of Gibraltar are 
assumed to be defended, the optimal interdictions become the Strait of Bab el Mandeb 
and the Strait of Malacca, with a cost increase of 22.54%.  
Assuming all the arcs in Gibraltar, Panama, Suez and Bab el Mandeb are 
defended, the optimal simultaneous attack on two arcs involves the arcs of the straits of 
Malacca and Sunda, with a cost increase of 8.27%. This value can still be considered 
relatively large given that is calculated assuming four critical regions are already 
defended. In fact, we provide a ranking of the six most costly pairs of interdictions under 
these conditions, and all of them contain the Strait of Malacca. Furthermore, if we allow 
three interdictions, an attack on the arcs in the straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok 
yields a cost increment of 15.54%.  
Fortunately, these worst-case scenarios of attack improve if we add an additional 
defense in the Strait of Malacca: the cost increment decreases from 8.27% to 1.5% for 
two interdictions, and from 15.54% to 2.17% for three interdictions.  
All analysis reported in this thesis can be independently repeated using the data 
given here. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Future research may use the existing model to analyze other non-piracy scenarios, 
such as the denial of an entire area by a country. 
Even though we use the 120 most important ports, a more accurate result could be 
achieved by considering many other smaller ports around the world. In addition, more 
accurate supply and demand information could be obtained, for example, from maritime 
insurance companies like Lloyd’s.  
The model can also be improved by adding more realistic features, such as 
different types of vessels (by size, tonnage, country of registration, etc.) and cargo (oil, 
grains, containerized cargo, bulk cargo, etc.). Then, some routes could be restricted for 
certain vessel sizes or types of cargo.   
The analysis can also be enhanced by allowing a multi-modal transportation 
network (including air, train and truck), so the cost of transporting the cargo by other 
means could be compared with the cost of rerouting the cargo by sea.  This is especially 
important when a sea route is completely blocked, as in the case of straits or canals, and 
when ports become isolated.  
The models presented here scale up and there is no telltale that these 
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APPENDIX  
This appendix contains the list of 416 arcs used in our model of global maritime 
network. We include the length of the arc and the penalty distance if the arc is interdicted. 
Note: For arcs with “infinite” penalty (complete blockage), our implementation uses a 
penalty equal to the sum of all of the arc lengths. 
 
From To 
Length    
(n.m.) 
Penalty     
(n.m.) 
Au_Hedland Au_Dampier 123.25 50
Au_Hedland Ph_Manila 2417.66 200
Au_Hedland Darwin 1073.89 150
Au_Hedland LombokS 779.93 150
Au_Dampier Au_Hedland 123.25 50
Au_Dampier SundaW 1263.72 150
Au_Dampier So_RichardsBay 5234.11 200
Au_Newcastle Au_Brisbane 384.20 50
Au_HayPoint Au_Gladstone 216.07 50
Au_HayPoint Us_LosAngeles 7164.14 200
Au_HayPoint HornIsland 899.58 50
Au_HayPoint PanamaW 8789.93 200
Au_Gladstone Au_Brisbane 273.20 50
Au_Gladstone Au_HayPoint 216.07 50
Au_Gladstone Magellan 6395.54 200
Au_Brisbane Au_Newcastle 384.20 50
Au_Brisbane Au_Gladstone 273.20 50
Be_Antwerp Be_Zeebrugge 52.50 50
Be_Antwerp Ne_Rotterdam 48.83 50
Be_Antwerp Uk_Grimsby 255.38 50
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From To 
Length    
(n.m.) 
Penalty     
(n.m.) 
Be_Zeebrugge Be_Antwerp 52.50 50
Be_Zeebrugge Fr_Dunkirk 41.20 50
Br_Itaqui Natal 2207.13 50
Br_Itaqui Caribe 3202.55 50
Br_Tubarao BrazilGroup 507.10 50
Br_Sepetiba BrazilGroup 199.08 50
Br_Santos BrazilGroup 305.12 50
Br_SaoSebastiao BrazilGroup 255.11 50
Br_Paranagua BrazilGroup 428.35 50
Br_AngradosReis BrazilGroup 224.23 50
Ca_Vancouver Us_LosAngeles 1079.90 50
Ca_Vancouver Us_Valdez 1217.69 50
Ca_Vancouver Ja_Yokohama 4708.13 200
Ch_Qingdao Ch_Rizhao 65.76 50
Ch_Qingdao Ch_Yantai 113.09 50
Ch_Qinhuangdao Ch_Dalian 128.59 50
Ch_Shanghai Ch_Ningbo 94.20 50
Ch_Shanghai Ch_Nantong 62.02 50
Ch_Shanghai Ch_Lianyungang 266.74 50
Ch_Shanghai Ch_Taichung 484.55 50
Ch_Shanghai Ko_Inchon 523.34 50
Ch_Shanghai Jeju 348.39 150
Ch_Tianjin Ch_Dalian 237.27 50
Ch_Ningbo Ch_Shanghai 94.20 50
Ch_Guangzhou Ch_Shenzhen 64.75 50
Ch_HongKong Ch_Shenzhen 10.66 50
Ch_HongKong Ch_Kaohsiung 420.02 50
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From To 
Length    
(n.m.) 
Penalty     
(n.m.) 
Ch_HongKong Ph_Manila 701.91 150
Ch_HongKong Si_Singapore 1609.96 200
Ch_Dalian Ch_Qinhuangdao 128.59 50
Ch_Dalian Ch_Tianjin 237.27 50
Ch_Dalian Ch_Yingkou 125.52 50
Ch_Dalian Ch_Yantai 100.61 50
Ch_Dalian Ch_Tangshan 190.23 50
Ch_Shenzhen Ch_Guangzhou 64.75 50
Ch_Shenzhen Ch_HongKong 10.66 50
Ch_Rizhao Ch_Qingdao 65.76 50
Ch_Rizhao Ch_Lianyungang 59.23 50
Ch_Yingkou Ch_Dalian 125.52 50
Ch_Nantong Ch_Shanghai 62.02 50
Ch_Nantong Ch_Nanjing 122.99 50
Ch_Yantai Ch_Qingdao 113.09 50
Ch_Yantai Ch_Dalian 100.61 50
Ch_Yantai Ko_Inchon 288.30 100
Ch_Yantai Jeju 381.23 150
Ch_Nanjing Ch_Nantong 122.99 50
Ch_Tangshan Ch_Dalian 190.23 50
Ch_Lianyungang Ch_Shanghai 266.74 50
Ch_Lianyungang Ch_Rizhao 59.23 50
Ch_Lianyungang Jeju 423.69 150
Ch_Kaohsiung Ch_HongKong 420.02 50
Ch_Kaohsiung Ch_Taichung 86.24 50
Ch_Kaohsiung Ph_Manila 581.54 150
Ch_Taichung Ch_Shanghai 484.55 50
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From To 
Length    
(n.m.) 
Penalty     
(n.m.) 
Ch_Taichung Ch_Kaohsiung 86.24 50
Eg_Alexandria SuezN 149.14 100
Fr_Marseilles It_Leghorn 248.40 50
Fr_Marseilles Sp_Barcelona 209.96 50
Fr_Marseilles Messina 645.97 150
Fr_LeHavre Fr_Calais 126.97 50
Fr_LeHavre Uk_Southampton 118.47 100
Fr_Dunkirk Be_Zeebrugge 41.20 50
Fr_Dunkirk Fr_Calais 23.19 50
Fr_Dunkirk Uk_London 113.04 100
Fr_Calais Fr_LeHavre 126.97 50
Fr_Calais Fr_Dunkirk 23.19 50
Ge_Hamburg Ge_Bremen 57.93 50
Ge_Bremen Ge_Hamburg 57.93 50
Ge_Bremen Ge_Wilhelmshaven 19.60 50
Ge_Wilhelmshaven Ge_Bremen 19.60 50
Ge_Wilhelmshaven Ne_Amsterdam 153.08 50
Ge_Wilhelmshaven Uk_Grimsby 341.31 150
Ge_Wilhelmshaven NorthSea 245.97 100
Ge_Lubeck Ru_Primorsk 804.30 150
Ge_Lubeck Sw_Gothenburg 270.18 100
In_Madras In_Paradip 654.28 150
In_Madras SriLanka 491.53 150
In_Madras BandaAceh 1107.35 150
In_JawaharlalNehru In_Bombay 8.80 50
In_JawaharlalNehru In_Mormugao 249.59 50
In_Calcutta In_Paradip 192.52 50
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From To 
Length    
(n.m.) 
Penalty     
(n.m.) 
In_Bombay In_JawaharlalNehru 8.80 50
In_Bombay Pa_Karachi 551.45 150
In_Paradip In_Madras 654.28 150
In_Paradip In_Calcutta 192.52 50
In_Paradip BandaAceh 1126.90 150
In_Mormugao In_JawaharlalNehru 249.59 50
In_Mormugao In_NewMangalore 183.57 50
In_Mormugao Oman 987.40 150
In_Mormugao Socotra 1291.91 150
In_NewMangalore In_Mormugao 183.57 50
In_NewMangalore SriLanka 535.22 150
Io_TanjungPriok SundaE 121.06 100
It_Genoa It_Leghorn 90.32 50
It_Trieste ItalyHeel 487.55 50
It_Taranto ItalyHeel 107.06 50
It_Leghorn Fr_Marseilles 248.40 50
It_Leghorn It_Genoa 90.32 50
It_Leghorn Messina 469.87 50
Ja_Nagoya Ja_Yokohama 155.07 50
Ja_Nagoya Ja_Kobe 102.68 50
Ja_Nagoya Ph_Manila 1731.83 200
Ja_Nagoya Darwin 3178.27 200
Ja_Chiba Ja_Yokohama 28.65 50
Ja_Chiba Ja_Tokyo 23.96 50
Ja_Yokohama Ca_Vancouver 4708.13 200
Ja_Yokohama Ja_Chiba 28.65 50
Ja_Yokohama Ja_Nagoya 155.07 50
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From To 
Length    
(n.m.) 
Penalty     
(n.m.) 
Ja_Yokohama Us_LosAngeles 5489.76 200
Ja_Yokohama Us_Valdez 3590.31 200
Ja_Kitakyushu Ja_Kobe 252.83 50
Ja_Kitakyushu Ko_Busan 136.05 100
Ja_Kobe Ja_Nagoya 102.68 50
Ja_Kobe Ja_Kitakyushu 252.83 50
Ja_Kobe Ja_Osaka 17.42 50
Ja_Osaka Ja_Kobe 17.42 50
Ja_Tokyo Ja_Chiba 23.96 50
Ko_Busan Ja_Kitakyushu 136.05 100
Ko_Busan Ko_Ulsan 28.13 50
Ko_Busan Jeju 168.88 100
Ko_Ulsan Ko_Busan 28.13 50
Ko_Ulsan Ko_Pohang 33.26 50
Ko_Inchon Ch_Shanghai 523.34 150
Ko_Inchon Ch_Yantai 288.30 100
Ko_Inchon Jeju 249.11 100
Ko_Pohang Ko_Ulsan 33.26 50
Ma_Kelang Ma_TanjungPelepas 186.43 ∞
Ma_Kelang BandaAceh 496.79 150
Ma_TanjungPelepas Ma_Kelang 186.43 ∞
Ma_TanjungPelepas Si_Singapore 17.23 ∞
Ne_Rotterdam Be_Antwerp 48.83 50
Ne_Rotterdam Ne_Amsterdam 36.91 50
Ne_Amsterdam Ne_Rotterdam 36.91 50
Ne_Amsterdam Ge_Wilhelmshaven 153.08 50
No_Bergen NorthSea 251.44 100
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From To 
Length    
(n.m.) 
Penalty     
(n.m.) 
Pa_Karachi Oman 380.60 150
Pa_Karachi In_Bombay 551.45 150
Ph_Manila Au_Hedland 2417.66 200
Ph_Manila Ch_HongKong 701.91 150
Ph_Manila Ch_Kaohsiung 581.54 150
Ph_Manila Ja_Nagoya 1731.83 200
Ph_Manila Si_Singapore 1486.75 150
Ph_Manila Us_LosAngeles 7296.83 200
Ph_Manila HornIsland 2252.84 200
Ph_Manila LombokN 1570.66 200
Ph_Manila PanamaW 10377.33 200
Ro_Constantza Ur_Odessa 189.32 50
Ro_Constantza BosphorusN 195.44 100
Ru_Novorossisk Ur_Odessa 361.16 150
Ru_Novorossisk BosphorusN 489.09 150
Ru_Primorsk Ge_Lubeck 804.30 150
Ru_Primorsk Ru_StPetersburg 55.86 50
Ru_StPetersburg Ru_Primorsk 55.86 50
Sa_Jubail Oman 763.95 150
Sa_Yanbu Sa_Jeddah 189.51 50
Sa_Yanbu SuezS 469.56 150
Sa_Jeddah Sa_Yanbu 189.51 50
Sa_Jeddah Aden 833.45 ∞
Si_Singapore Ch_HongKong 1609.96 200
Si_Singapore Ma_TanjungPelepas 17.23 ∞
Si_Singapore Ph_Manila 1486.75 150
Si_Singapore SundaE 517.76 150
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From To 
Length    
(n.m.) 
Penalty     
(n.m.) 
So_RichardsBay Au_Dampier 5234.11 200
So_RichardsBay So_Durban 96.16 50
So_RichardsBay Comoros 1269.86 150
So_RichardsBay SundaW 4884.89 200
So_SaldanhaBay So_Durban 801.29 50
So_SaldanhaBay BrazilGroup 3592.26 200
So_SaldanhaBay Natal 3839.20 200
So_SaldanhaBay Dakar 4086.22 200
So_Durban So_RichardsBay 96.16 50
So_Durban So_SaldanhaBay 801.29 50
Sp_Algeciras GibraltarW 282.62 ∞
Sp_Algeciras GibraltarE 303.88 ∞
Sp_Valencia Sp_Tarragona 142.40 50
Sp_Valencia GibraltarE 187.16 50
Sp_Barcelona Fr_Marseilles 209.96 50
Sp_Barcelona Sp_Tarragona 51.50 50
Sp_Bilbao Brest 401.45 150
Sp_Bilbao Corunna 348.76 50
Sp_Tarragona Sp_Valencia 142.40 50
Sp_Tarragona Sp_Barcelona 51.50 50
Sp_Tarragona Messina 791.52 150
Sw_Gothenburg Ge_Lubeck 270.18 100
Sw_Gothenburg NorthSea 252.70 100
Tu_Izmit BosphorusS 55.16 50
Uk_Grimsby Be_Antwerp 255.38 50
Uk_Grimsby Ge_Wilhelmshaven 341.31 150
Uk_Grimsby Uk_Tees 84.69 50
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From To 
Length    
(n.m.) 
Penalty     
(n.m.) 
Uk_London Fr_Dunkirk 113.04 100
Uk_Tees Uk_Grimsby 84.69 50
Uk_Tees Uk_Forth 117.48 50
Uk_Tees NorthSea 295.60 100
Uk_Southampton Fr_LeHavre 118.47 100
Uk_Southampton Brest 229.88 100
Uk_Forth Uk_Tees 117.48 50
Uk_MilfordHaven Uk_Liverpool 152.99 50
Uk_MilfordHaven Brest 201.52 100
Uk_Liverpool Uk_MilfordHaven 152.99 50
Ur_Odessa Ro_Constantza 189.32 50
Ur_Odessa Ru_Novorossisk 361.16 150
Ur_Odessa BosphorusN 360.85 150
Us_SouthLouisiana USSouthGroup 750.94 50
Us_Houston USSouthGroup 821.73 50
Us_NewYork USEastGroup 249.70 50
Us_CorpusChristi USSouthGroup 865.58 50
Us_LongBeach Us_LosAngeles 17.83 50
Us_NewOrleans USSouthGroup 605.90 50
Us_Beaumont USSouthGroup 775.95 50
Us_Huntington USEastGroup 651.60 50
Us_Mobile USSouthGroup 596.86 50
Us_HamptonRoads USEastGroup 341.50 50
Us_Plaquemines USSouthGroup 550.00 50
Us_LosAngeles Au_HayPoint 7164.14 200
Us_LosAngeles Ca_Vancouver 1079.90 150
Us_LosAngeles Ja_Yokohama 5489.76 200
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From To 
Length    
(n.m.) 
Penalty     
(n.m.) 
Us_LosAngeles Ph_Manila 7296.83 200
Us_LosAngeles Us_LongBeach 17.83 50
Us_LosAngeles PanamaW 3089.59 200
Us_LakeCharles USSouthGroup 742.14 50
Us_TexasCity USSouthGroup 783.86 50
Us_BatonRouge USSouthGroup 671.46 50
Us_Tampa USSouthGroup 400.93 50
Us_Baltimore USEastGroup 339.66 50
Us_Paulsboro USEastGroup 277.33 50
Us_Valdez Ca_Vancouver 1217.69 150
Us_Valdez Ja_Yokohama 3590.31 200
Us_Savannah USEastGroup 744.52 50
Us_Pascagoula USSouthGroup 587.19 50
Aden Sa_Jeddah 833.45 ∞
Aden Socotra 623.62 150
BandaAceh In_Madras 1107.35 150
BandaAceh In_Paradip 1126.90 150
BandaAceh Ma_Kelang 496.79 150
BandaAceh SriLanka 1122.98 150
BandaAceh SundaW 1110.74 150
BosphorusN Ro_Constantza 195.44 100
BosphorusN Ru_Novorossisk 489.09 150
BosphorusN Ur_Odessa 360.85 150
BosphorusN BosphorusS 44.26 ∞
BosphorusS Tu_Izmit 55.16 50
BosphorusS BosphorusN 44.26 ∞
BosphorusS Myrina 212.02 100
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From To 
Length    
(n.m.) 
Penalty     
(n.m.) 
BrazilGroup Br_Tubarao 507.10 50
BrazilGroup Br_Sepetiba 199.08 50
BrazilGroup Br_Santos 305.12 50
BrazilGroup Br_SaoSebastiao 255.11 50
BrazilGroup Br_Paranagua 428.35 50
BrazilGroup Br_AngradosReis 224.23 50
BrazilGroup So_SaldanhaBay 3592.26 200
BrazilGroup Natal 1459.56 50
BrazilGroup Magellan 2564.64 200
Brest Sp_Bilbao 401.45 150
Brest Uk_Southampton 229.88 100
Brest Uk_MilfordHaven 201.52 100
Brest Corunna 403.43 150
Brest USEastGroup 3227.52 200
Caribe Br_Itaqui 3202.55 200
Caribe GibraltarW 4066.71 200
Caribe PanamaE 562.68 150
Caribe USEastGroup 1649.23 200
Caribe USSouthGroup 981.48 150
Comoros So_RichardsBay 1269.86 150
Comoros Socotra 2003.13 200
Comoros SriLanka 2761.27 200
Corunna Sp_Bilbao 348.76 50
Corunna Brest 403.43 150
Corunna GibraltarW 569.63 50
Crete ItalyHeel 514.31 50
Crete Messina 634.49 150
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From To 
Length    
(n.m.) 
Penalty     
(n.m.) 
Crete Myrina 306.84 150
Crete SuezN 404.77 150
Dakar So_SaldanhaBay 4086.22 200
Dakar Natal 1728.21 200
Dakar GibraltarW 1540.38 200
Dakar USEastGroup 3531.81 200
Darwin Au_Hedland 1073.89 150
Darwin Ja_Nagoya 3178.27 200
Darwin HornIsland 781.27 150
Darwin LombokN 1044.52 150
Darwin LombokS 1053.91 150
Darwin SundaE 1623.76 200
GibraltarE Sp_Algeciras 303.88 ∞
GibraltarE Sp_Valencia 187.16 50
GibraltarE Messina 861.14 150
GibraltarW Sp_Algeciras 282.62 ∞
GibraltarW Caribe 4066.71 200
GibraltarW Corunna 569.63 50
GibraltarW Dakar 1540.38 200
GibraltarW USEastGroup 3253.77 200
GibraltarW USSouthGroup 4477.24 200
HornIsland Au_HayPoint 899.58 50
HornIsland Ph_Manila 2252.84 200
HornIsland Darwin 781.27 150
ItalyHeel It_Trieste 487.55 50
ItalyHeel It_Taranto 107.06 50
ItalyHeel Messina 219.19 50
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From To 
Length    
(n.m.) 
Penalty     
(n.m.) 
ItalyHeel Crete 514.31 50
Jeju Ch_Shanghai 348.39 150
Jeju Ch_Yantai 381.23 150
Jeju Ch_Lianyungang 423.69 150
Jeju Ko_Busan 168.88 100
Jeju Ko_Inchon 249.11 100
LombokN Ph_Manila 1570.66 200
LombokN Darwin 1044.52 150
LombokN LombokS 126.38 ∞
LombokN SundaE 581.77 150
LombokS Au_Hedland 779.93 150
LombokS Darwin 1053.91 150
LombokS LombokN 126.38 ∞
LombokS SundaW 814.90 150
Magellan Au_Gladstone 6395.54 200
Magellan BrazilGroup 2564.64 200
Magellan PanamaW 4319.99 200
Messina Fr_Marseilles 645.97 150
Messina It_Leghorn 469.87 150
Messina Sp_Tarragona 791.52 150
Messina Crete 634.49 150
Messina GibraltarE 861.14 150
Messina ItalyHeel 219.19 50
Myrina BosphorusS 212.02 100
Myrina Crete 306.84 150
Natal Br_Itaqui 2207.13 50
Natal So_SaldanhaBay 3839.20 200
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From To 
Length    
(n.m.) 
Penalty     
(n.m.) 
Natal BrazilGroup 1459.56 50
Natal Dakar 1728.21 200
NorthSea Ge_Wilhelmshaven 245.97 100
NorthSea No_Bergen 251.44 100
NorthSea Sw_Gothenburg 252.70 100
NorthSea Uk_Tees 295.60 100
Oman In_Mormugao 987.40 150
Oman Pa_Karachi 380.60 150
Oman Sa_Jubail 763.95 150
Oman Socotra 840.61 150
PanamaE Caribe 562.68 150
PanamaE PanamaW 459.36 ∞
PanamaE USSouthGroup 912.96 150
PanamaW Au_HayPoint 8789.93 200
PanamaW Ph_Manila 10377.33 200
PanamaW Us_LosAngeles 3089.59 200
PanamaW Magellan 4319.99 200
PanamaW PanamaE 459.36 ∞
Socotra In_Mormugao 1291.91 150
Socotra Aden 623.62 150
Socotra Comoros 2003.13 200
Socotra Oman 840.61 150
Socotra SriLanka 1693.99 200
SriLanka In_Madras 491.53 150
SriLanka In_NewMangalore 535.22 150
SriLanka BandaAceh 1122.98 150
SriLanka Comoros 2761.27 200
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From To 
Length    
(n.m.) 
Penalty     
(n.m.) 
SriLanka Socotra 1693.99 200
SriLanka SundaW 1975.67 200
SuezN Eg_Alexandria 149.14 100
SuezN Crete 404.77 150
SuezN SuezS 199.31 ∞
SuezS Sa_Yanbu 469.56 150
SuezS SuezN 199.31 ∞
SundaE Io_TanjungPriok 121.06 100
SundaE Si_Singapore 517.76 150
SundaE Darwin 1623.76 200
SundaE LombokN 581.77 150
SundaE SundaW 327.32 ∞
SundaW Au_Dampier 1263.72 150
SundaW So_RichardsBay 4884.89 200
SundaW BandaAceh 1110.74 150
SundaW LombokS 814.90 150
SundaW SriLanka 1975.67 200
SundaW SundaE 327.32 ∞
USEastGroup Us_NewYork 249.70 50
USEastGroup Us_Huntington 651.60 50
USEastGroup Us_HamptonRoads 341.50 50
USEastGroup Us_Baltimore 339.66 50
USEastGroup Us_Paulsboro 277.33 50
USEastGroup Us_Savannah 744.52 50
USEastGroup Brest 3227.52 200
USEastGroup Caribe 1649.23 200
USEastGroup Dakar 3531.81 200
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From To 
Length    
(n.m.) 
Penalty     
(n.m.) 
USEastGroup GibraltarW 3253.77 200
USEastGroup USSouthGroup 1387.95 150
USSouthGroup Us_SouthLouisiana 750.94 50
USSouthGroup Us_Houston 821.73 50
USSouthGroup Us_CorpusChristi 865.58 50
USSouthGroup Us_NewOrleans 605.90 50
USSouthGroup Us_Beaumont 775.95 50
USSouthGroup Us_Mobile 596.86 50
USSouthGroup Us_Plaquemines 550.00 50
USSouthGroup Us_LakeCharles 742.14 50
USSouthGroup Us_TexasCity 783.86 50
USSouthGroup Us_BatonRouge 671.46 50
USSouthGroup Us_Tampa 400.93 50
USSouthGroup Us_Pascagoula 587.19 50
USSouthGroup Caribe 981.48 150
USSouthGroup GibraltarW 4477.24 200
USSouthGroup PanamaE 912.96 150
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